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The Nature and Functions of Schemas
Schema theory is one of the most intellectually exciting
areas of current cognitive psychology. There has been a very
rapid growth of ideas and data on this topic so that it is
difficult to understand what has been accomplished. In this
paper we attempt to give an analytic account of the nature and
functions of schemas in psychological theory and to organize some
of the experimental evidence dealing with the operation of
schemas in human memory. We will restrict ourselves to
laboratory studies and theories from cognitive psychology and
artificial intelligence and will not cover the schema literature
from social psychology.
Much of this paper is devoted to attempting to understand
what schemas are. In brief, they are higher-order cognitive
structures that have been hypothesized to underlie many aspects
of human knowledge and skill. They serve a crucial role in
providing an account of how old knowledge interacts with new
knowledge in perception, language, thought, and memory.
This paper is organized into six sections. The first
section is devoted to a detailed examination of the schema
concept as formulated by Bartlett. The second section relates
Bartlett's theory to the larger issue of the conflict in
psychological theory between ideas from British Empiricism and
ideas from Continental philosophy. The third section briefly
outlines some of the basic theoretical assumptions of information
processing psychology in order to serve as a background for our
analysis of schema theory. In the fourth section we examine
modern schema theory (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977; Rumelhart, 1980, reprinted in this volume) and contrast
these theories with Bartlett's theory and with the information
processing approach. In the fifth section we sketch out our own
position. In the final section we develop a framework for
analyzing the functions of schemas in the human memory process
and then examine a number of recent experiments in terms of this
framework.
Bartlett's Schema Theory
The schema theory Bartlett developed in his book Remembering
(1932), has been the inspiration for most modern schema theories.
Bartlett's work is a particularly powerful presentation of schema
theory and on some issues his theory is worked out in more depth
than current schema theories, so his work merits careful
consideration. In this section we will analyze Bartlett's basic
assumptions and lay out the conceptual core of his theory.
Bartlett's Definition of Schemas
Bartlett (1932) defined a schema as "an active organization
of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be
supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response"
(p. 201). Bartlett's book consists of an elaboration of his
schema theory and an application of it to data he had gathered
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much earlier on memory for figures, pictures, and stories (e.g.,
Bartlett, 1916, 1920, 1921).
First we would like to know what kind of construct schemas
were for Bartlett. In the terms of modern philosophy of science
(cf. Suppe, 1977), was Bartlett an instrumentalist (schemas are
just constructs used to organize the data) or was he a realist
(schemas exist and the schema theory attempts to describes them)?
It is clear from Bartlett's text that he was a realist with
respect to his schema theory. Given that he is a realist what
kind of entities does he think schemas are? It appears he
assumes that they are unconscious mental processes. In a
discussion of the neurologist Head's schema theory Bartlett
stated that "schemata are active, without any awareness at all"
(1932, p. 200) and even more clearly in his autobiography he
stated that schemas have the same status as images and ideas but
that Lhey are not available to introspection (1936, p. 47).
The hypothesis that schemas are complex unconscious
knowledge structures is one of Bartlett's major contributions.
In his book Bartlett generously gave Head credit for developing
the sciema hypothesis. However, on this issue, as on many
others, Bartlett's theory is very different. Head gave only a
sketchy account of his approach, but it seems likely that he
considered schemas to be physiological entities. Thus, he
stated, "schemata lie for ever outside consciousness; they are
physiological processes with no direct psychical equivalent"
(Head, 1918, p. 158). Many psychologists and philosophers have
found the concept of an unconscious mental process hard to
accept. When the Wurzberg psychologists postulated such entities
they were attacked by the introspective psychologists of the
time, who belived that the data of psychology were restricted to
conscious phenomena (see Humphrey, 1951). They were also
attacked by behaviorists, who thought that the data of psychology
were restricted to observations of overt behavior (Watson, 1913).
However, in recent years a number of philosophers have made
powerful arguments for the acceptance of unconscious mental
processes as proper objects of scientific study (e.g., Fodor,
1968; Putnam, 1973) and these processes form the core of modern
information processing psychology.
Properties of Schemas
Having established that Bartlett took schemas to be
unconscious mental structures, we now examine their
characteristics. In Bartlett's (1932) abstract definition of
schemas he consistently described them as "organized," but gave
little further specification. He did state that the term
"pattern" would not be quite accurate, since it implies more
detail than he intended. However, in the analysis of the various
memory experiments reported in his book he gave a number of
examples that help clarify his use of the term "organized." He
probably intended the term to cover the organization involved in
such things as: symmetrical visual figures (p. 24); rules (p.
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52); the plan of a prose passage (p. 83--he gives the structure
of a "cumulative story" as an example, cf. Rumelhart, 1975); and
literary conventions (p. 140-he gives ending with a moral as an
example, cf. Brewer, in press). If this is a correct reading of
Bartlett, then it is clear that the term "organized" covers a
very wide range of cognitive structures.
Another fundamental aspect of schemas in Bartlett's theory
is that they are composed of old knowledge. Thus, he stated that
they are "masses of organized past experiences" (1932, pp. 197-
198). However, there are a wide variety of ways in which old
knowledge could be represented and Bartlett had a specific
hypothesis about the form of representation in schemas. In
particular, Bartlett wanted to develop an alternative to the
standard British Empiricist view that old knowledge was
represented in the form of a collection of specific mental images
(e.g., Hobbs, Berkeley, James Mill). Head and Holmes (1911, p.
186) had initially developed schema theory in neurology as an
alternative to the image view as applied to body posture and
movement. This was one important component of Head's theory that
Bartlett wanted to retain. However, he wanted to apply it to all
the higher mental processes and he attacked Head for implicitly
accepting the image position for other psychological processes
(1932, p. 200).
Operation of Schemas
In adopting the position that much of old knowledge was
represented in the form of unconscious mental structures Bartlett
had already made a major break with the image view. However, he
also wanted to emphasize that knowledge was represented in larger
units. Thus, he stated that schemas "operate, not simply as
individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary
mass" (1932, p. 201). Not only did he believe that schemas
operated as larger units of knowledge, but he argued that schemas
developed into qualitatively different cognitive structures. He
stated that, "the past operates as an organized mass rather than
as a group of elements each of which retains its specific
character" (1932, p. 197).
By examining Bartlett's account of his memory data it is
possible to infer what type of qualitative change Bartlett had in
mind. He believed that schemas were generic mental structures.
He assumed that in the course of exposure to many particular
instances of phenomena the mind abstracted a generic cognitive
representation (i.e., a schema). Bartlett often discussed this
issue by comparing conventional modes of representing cultural
artifacts in societies with conventional modes of representation
within individuals. In one analysis of this issue he referred to
the "stereotyped modes of representation or of reaction" of
individuals and suggested that these "conventionalizations are
produced by a combination of innumerable small changes" (1932, p.
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95). Overall, a close reading of Bartlett suggests that he
hypothesized schemas to be unconscious mental structures
organized into generic cognitive representations.
In addition to these structural characteristics of schemas,
Bartlett developed a number of proposals about schema processing.
His fundamental processing assumption was that all new
information interacts with the old information represented in the
schema. This is one of the assumptions that Bartlett's theory
and Head's theory had in common. In discussing postural change
Head and Holmes had stated "Every recognizable change enters into
consciousness already charged with its relation to something that
has gone before" (Head, 1920, p. 605), and Bartlett quoted this
section )f their paper with approval. However, this is an aspect
of Bartlett's approach to schemas that was present in his earlier
work. In his first published experiment Bartlett explained
errors made by his subjects in recalled visual figures by the
interaction of new and old information. He stated that many of
the errors were due to "the tendency to interpret presented
materialt ;T. iccordance with the general character of earlier
experience" (1916, p. 231).
In his later discussions of the interaction of old schema-
based information with new input, Bartlett focused on the active
nature of this process. He felt that earlier writers who had
considered the role of old knowledge had treated the old
information as a passive framework, somewhat like a partially
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completed jigsaw puzzle capable of accepting the appropriate
piece. Bartlett felt that the data in his memory studies were
not consistent with a passive schema process. When he presented
subjects with material to recall they made a large number of
errors. Many of the errors were more regular, more meaningful,
and more conventionalized than the original stimuli. Bartlett
took these results to indicate that the subjects were actively
attempting to relate the new material to old schema information--
a process he called "effort after meaning." He stated that to
accept the passive view "as if what is accepted and given a place
in mental life is always simply a question of what fits into
already formed apperception systems is to miss the obvious point
that the process of fitting is an active process" (1932, p. 85).
Bartlett typically gathered introspective reports during the
recall process and on the basis of these protocols he concluded
that the active processes were sometimes conscious strategies on
the part of the subject (1932, p. 87-89), but more frequently he
found them to be active unconscious processes (1932, p. 20).
Bartlett also thought that schema processes were generative,
where generative means a process that can deal with an
indefinitely large number of new instances. He was particularly
clear on this characteristic of schema processing when discussing
motor production schemas. Bartlett pointed out that a skilled
tennis player is more likely to hit a tennis ball than an
unskilled player, even when the ball appears in a new location
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never before experienced by the skilled player. Thus, he argued
that the old information accumulated by the skilled player is not
in the form of a set of fixed motor movements, but in the form of
a generative motor schema (1932, p. 202).
Bartlett's Memory Theories
The final aspect of Bartlett's schema theory that we will
discuss in detail is his theory of the recall process. Bartlett
actually had two different theories of recall. When he was
talking abstractly and focusing on the mistakes of the storehouse
or trace models he adopted a pure reconstructive model. However,
when he was explaining his actual data he adopted a partial
reconstructive model.
Pure reconstructive recall. The pure reconstructive model
assumes that when an individual is exposed to some new
information that new information serves to modify the appropriate
schema, but that no specific episodic representation of the new
information is retained in memory. Thus, for example, if someone
goes into an office that they have never been in before, the
information about that office will be integrated with the
individual's established office schema and will modify that
schema to some extent. Bartlett stated that the recall for a
specific event, such as the visit to the office, is carried out
by having "the organism . . . turn . . .round upon its own
'schemata'" (1932, p. 202). Many writers have felt that this
aspect of Bartlett's theory was incomprehensible. It does not
seem so to us. If one reads this section of his memory theory in
the context of his earlier published work and recognizes his
concern with the issue of personal memory, then the problem
Bartlett is dealing with becomes clear. He was concerned with
providing an account of how an individual produces a specific
memory representation from a generic schema representation. In
the section of his book where he developed the pure
reconstructive theory, Bartlett stated that an individual
attempting to remember a specific event cannot base the recall on
specific traces since "the individual details that have built
them up have disappeared, but somehow /must/ construct or . . .
infer from what is present the probable constituents and their
order which went to build them up" (1932, p. 202). The pure
schema reconstructive theory of recall succeeds admirably in
dispensing with specific traces and gives a natural account of
schema-based inferential errors in recall. However, it has a
fatal flaw--it allows no recall of unique episodic information
from the original episode. Thus, in the case of the earlier
example of recall of an office, the pure reconstructive theory
accounts nicely for the recall of generic schema information
(e.g., typewriter, chairs) and provides an explanation of schema-
based errors in recall (e.g., recalling books or filing cabinets
when none were present--see Brewer & Treyens, 1981). However,
the theory cannot account for the recall of specific nongeneric
information about the room (e.g., that the typewriter was an
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Underwood standard or that one of the chairs was made of
plastic). Obviously, the pure schema reconstructive theory is in
error. This is the natural consequence of combining a schema
theory with a memory theory that allows no specific "trace"
information whatsoever.
The problem of how specific memories are derived from
generic schemas was discussed briefly by Bartlett. He stated
that "somehow we have to find a way of individualizing some of
the characteristics of the total functioning mass of the moment"
(1932, p. 206). His solution was to suggest that "images are a
device for picking bits out of schemas" (1932, p. 219). Most
writers discussing Bartlett's theory have found these comments to
be unintelligible. However, again we do not think that this is
the case. Bartlett apparently assumed that specific memories are
what Brewer and Pani (1983) call personal memories. A personal
memory is a recollection of information from an individual's past
that is experienced in terms of visual imagery and is typically
accompanied by a belief that it represents a memory of a
particular time and location (cf. Brewer & Pani, 1983, for
additional discussion). If this analysis of Bartlett is correct,
then his discussion of the issue makes much more sense. He was
attempting to reconcile a memory theory based on unconscious
schemas with the phenomenally experienced images of specific
personal memories.
In a trace theory of memory, the memory theorist attempts to
account for the recall of specific memories by some type of
encoding and retrieval mechanism. Within the framework of the
pure reconstructive theory Bartlett faces serious difficulties in
providing a mechanism that produces specific memories from
generic schemas. He stated that "specific recall is, in fact, an
achievement of consciousness" (1935, p. 225). Although he gave
no more details, he apparently felt that one of the major
functions of consciousness was to allow an individual to generate
specific phenomenologically experienced representations from
unconscious generic schemas. He also suggested that the
instantiation process was guided by the individual's "attitudes"
(feeling and affect), but gave no clear account of how this
process might achieve the desired result (cf., 1932, pp. 206-
207). This is one of the only parts of Bartlett's memory theory
that has not been followed up by later memory theorists (however,
see Spiro, 1980).
Partial reconstructive recall. The pure reconstructive
schema theory of memory that has been outlined above is
Bartlett's "official" theory of memory-the one he presents
overtly when he is describing the memory process in abstract
theoretical terms. However, a close reading of Bartlett's
accounts of his actual experiments reveals a partially
reconstructive schema theory. This theory assumes that recall is
a joint function of a schema component and a specific episodic
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component. The motivation for the partially reconstructive
theory apparently derives from certain aspects of his memory
data. In a number of places Bartlett noted that there was recall
of specific nonschema-related material. Thus, in an experiment
on memory for visual symbols he stated, "The persistence of
certain kinds of novel detail is an undoubted fact" (1932, p.
107). In his experiment on repeated reproduction of stories he
noted that "as a rule one or two striking details seemed to recur
with as little change as the form itself" (1932, p. 83). In an
experiment on the serial reproduction of pictures, he pointed out
that some nonschema details were frequently retained and stated
that "This constitutes yet another case of that curious
preservation of the trivial, the odd, the disconnected, the
unimportant detail" (1932, p. 184). While Bartlett never overtly
presented a theory that combines memory for specific information
with his schema theory, he certainly suggested it in several
places. In a discussion of inferences made in a memory-for-faces
task he noted "that inferences, based upon judgements of this
kind, are mingled unwittingly with the actual recall of
perceptual material or patterns" (1932, p. 52). In a general
discussion of imagery and schemas he noted that during recall
some part of the event which has to be remembered recurs, and
the event is then reconstructed on the basis of the relation of
this specific bit of material to the general mass of relevant
past experience or reactions" (1932, p. 209). Thus, it seems to
us that when Bartlett was attempting to account for his own data
and when he was not focusing on his opposition to trace theories
that he implicitly held a partially reconstructive schema theory
of memory. Almost all later schema memory theorists adopt a form
of Bartlett's unofficial, partially reconstructive theory of
memory.
Within the partial reconstruction position, there is a
problem of the articulation of data and theory with respect to
recall of nonschema information. Bartlett often found that
nonschema information was not recalled (1932, p. 99) or was
transformed to fit some schema (1932, p. 89); but on other
occasions nonschema information was well recalled (1932, pp. 90,
184). Clearly, if a schema theory is to be explanatory it must
be articulated in ways that give a motivated account of these
apparently inconsistent data (see, Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980,
for a similar critique of modern schema theories).
In summary, Bartlett thought schemas were unconscious mental
structures. He believed that they were organized generic mental
representations that actively incorporated incoming episodic
information. On the specific issue of recall, Bartlett's
official position was a totally reconstructive theory, but in
practice, he also held a partially reconstructive account of
recall.
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Bartlett, British Empiricism, and Continental Philosophy
This section attempts to answer the following puzzle:
Bartlett's schema theory was published in 1932 and yet
contemporary schema theory dates from 1975 (Minsky, 1975;
Rumelhart, 1975). What caused the gap from 1932 to 1975? In
order to answer this question it is necessary to take a brief
metatheoretical detour. Mainstream American psychology in its
early introspective form (e.g., Titchener) and its stimulus-
response form (e.g., Watson, Hull, Skinner) was a direct
descendant from the conceptual framework of British Empiricism.
For our purpose the canonical British Empiricist position
concerning the structure of the mind can be characterized as:
(a) Empiricist--all knowledge derives from the environment. (b)
Atomistic--the mind is composed of simple elements. (c)
Parsimonious--the mind is composed of a small number of basic
types of elements. (d) Associationistic--the fundamental mental
mechanisms are associations which form through spatial and
temporal contiguity. (e) Particularistic--the basic elements are
particulars (not true of Locke). (f) Passive--the mind is not
active. (g) Mechanistic 
--the mind is not purposive, goal-
directed, or intentional. (h) Finite--no mechanisms are proposed
that would be capable of dealing with an indefinitely large
number of new situations. See Boring (1950), de Groot (1965),
and Mandler and Mandler (1964) for a more detailed discussion of
these positions. Continental philosophy (e.g., Leibniz, Kant,
Herbart, Lotze, Brentano) has not been as homogeneous as British
Empiricism, but has tended to take the opposite side on these
issues, thus the classic contrast between Empiricism and
Rationalism. We will view each of the theoretical paradigms
examined in this paper in terms of these fundamental
assumptions. However, in doing this, we will not include the
empiricist-nativist issue since it is rarely discussed by the
theorists we consider. If we were to impose our own
classification on these theories we would classify all the schema
theories as nativistic since theorists who postulate as much
mental machinery as schema theorists do are typically forced into
a nativist position (e.g., Chomsky, 1965).
The British Empiricist position has a certain aesthetic
appeal and has been the typical choice of the tough-minded
theorist. Most behavioral scientists have considered the British
Empiricist position to be the more "scientific" position. Thus,
when American psychology shifted to Behaviorism, there was a
drastic shift in the subject matter of psychology (from
phenomenal experience to behavior), but no change in each of the
assumptions outlined above. On these fundamental issues
stimulus-response psychology was in total agreement with British
Empiricism.
With this background in mind, it is now possible to examine
the reception of Bartlett's schema theory. Bartlett's work had
little impact on American psychology. In a review of the
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Remembering book McGeoch said the experiments were, "outside the
current of contemporary American research upon memory" (1933, p.
774), and in another review Jenkins concluded, "The book will
find a place upon the shelves of those who study remembering, but
it will not be in the special section reserved for those
investigators whose writings have become landmarks in the advance
towards the comprehension of this important problem" (1935, p.
715). In England, Bartlett's schema theory was taken much more
seriously (e.g., Oldfield & Zangwill, 1942a, 1942b, 194 3a,
1943b). However, even in England opinion shifted in the British
Empiricist direction and by the time Bartlett died his major
students considered the theory to have been a total failure
(Broadbent, 1970; Oldfield, 1972; Zangwill, 1972).
We think a comparison of the assumptions of Bartlett's
schema theory with the assumptions of British Empiricism makes
very clear what the problem was--on almost all of the issues
discussed above Bartlett's schema theory adopts the Continental
position (see Table 1). On the issue of parsimony Bartlett does
-------------- ----------
Insert Table 1 about here.
-------------------------
take the British Empiricist position (one construct, the schema,
does most of the work); however, on every one of the remaining
issues Bartlett's theory is clearly on the Continental side. The
intellectual roots of this heresy are to be found in Bartlett's
direct reading of the Continental philosophers, indirectly
through the influence of James Ward and G. F. Stout, and through
the work of the Wurzburg psychologists (see, Bartlett, 1936;
Broadbent, 1970; Drever, 1965; Northway, 1940; Zangwill, 1972).
Thus, Bartlett's schema theory was simply incompatible with the
basic theoretical assumptions of the stimulus-response psychology
that was dominant (in the United States) at the time he
formulated the theory. In fact, one basic thesis of this chapter
is that the history of the shifts from stimulus-response
psychology to information processing psychology to schema theory
is the history of a succession of psychologists who lust after
the British Empiricist position but who have been dragged
"kicking and screaming" by the brute facts of nature to the
Continental position.
Information Processing Psychology
In this section we will briefly sketch some of the core
theoretical assumptions made by theories in the information
processing tradition, as background for the assumptions made by
modern schema theories. By information processing theories we
mean theories based on a computer metaphor that trace the flow of
information in the mind through various stages of processing
(e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968;
Neisser, 1967; Newell & Simon, 1972). In terms of the contrast
between British Empiricism and Continental philosophy, the
information processing approach can be seen as a "profane union"
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(Anderson & Bower, 1973, p. 4) of the two traditions. In
shifting from stimulus-response theories to information
processing theories, there was a continuing acceptance of some of
the tenets of British Empiricism, but a rejection of a number of
others.
First, we would like to know what information processing
theorists consider their theories to be about (i.e., what
ontological assumptions do they make?). This is a difficult
questions, since many of the constructs used in these theories
have been taken from computer science and artificial
intelligence, and it is not clear how these borrowed constructs
are to be interpreted in psychological theories (see Pylyshyn,
1978, and commentary). Thus, many theorists prefer not to
address this issue directly or tend to be ambivalent when they
do. Neisser's book, Cognitive Psychology (1967), was one of the
major otrces in molding the information processing paradigm. He
argued that the "program analogy" makes it scientifically
respectable to study unconscious mental processes (1967, p. 8).
Thus, he apparently adopted the realist position that information
processing theories are theories about the nature of unconscious
mental processes. Quillian (1968) appeared to take a realist
position, Collins and Quillian (1969) avoided the issue, but
later Collins and Quillian (1972) appeared to take an
instrumentalist position. Anderson apparently took a realist
position with respect to the entities postulated in Anderson and
Bower (1973) but he took a radically instrumentalist position
several years later (Anderson, 1976). (See Anderson's discussion
of his change of view in Anderson, 1980, p. 85). Clearly the
workers in the information processing paradigm have not reached a
consensus on these difficult problems.
One of the major changes in the shift from behaviorist
theories to information processing theories was the rejection of
the assumption that the theories were about particulars.
Information processing psychologists did not accept the
assumption that psychological theories were restricted to
observable behavior; and they included abstract entities in their
theories (see Anderson & Bower's 1973 discussion of the "terminal
metapostulate" issue).
Through the influence of generative linguistics (Chomsky,
1965), many information processing theorists came to realize that
psychological theories need to provide an account of the ability
of human beings to deal appropriately with "new instances" in
language, perception, thought, and action. The researchers in
the information processing tradition came to see that inability
to deal with this aspect of human cognition was a fatal flaw in
stimulus-response theories, and so they introduced abstract
entities to allow some generativity.
Another fundamental shift made by information processing
psychology was the abandonment of the belief that all
psychological theories could be formulated in terms of
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associations (see Anderson & Bower, 1973, for a contrary opinion
on this point). Information processing theorists replaced the
simple association with a wide variety of relational and
structural entities: propositions (Kintsch, 1972); semantic
relations (Quillian, 1968); and semantic features (Smith, Shoben,
& Rips, 1974).
Some of the information processing theories avoided the
general tendency of stimulus-response theories to be passive and
nonpurposive, but there was not as much agreement on these
issues. Thus, Newell and Simon 1972) provided explicit goal-
directed problem-solving machinery that gave their theory a
purposive component. Anderson and Bower (1973) chose to retain a
passive memory representation ("strategy-free"), but include
active processes in their executive component.
Two of the British Empiricist assumptions have been retained
by the information processing approaches. All of the information
processing theories have been atomistic and parsimonious. They
have assumed that a complete theory of the mind could be
constructed with a small number of basic mental elements.
Holding to these assumptions has produced some interesting
problems. For example, Anderson's (1976) theory combines the
atomistic assumption with interference constructs to produce a
"fan" hypothesis--which, put crudely, is that the more you know
about a concept the slower and harder it will be to think about
an instance related to that concept. While there is some support
for this hypothesis in laboratory list-learning tasks it seems
highly unlikely that the fan effect occurs for real-world
knowledge. If the fan effect does not hold up for real world
knowledge (see Smith, 1981) then it would appear that theorists
in this tradition will have to carefully examine their
assumptions.
Overall, we think the picture is clear. Information
processing psychology was a partial move toward the Continental
tradition (see Table 1). The information processing theories
rejected many of the British Empiricist assumptions of the
earlier stimulus-response psychology, but retained a strong
belief in atomism and parsimony.
Modern Schema Theory
It is clear that by 1975 there had been a Zeitgeist which
prepared the cognitive science community for schema theory. In
that one year papers were published arguing for schema theory by
researchers in: artificial intelligence (Minsky, 1975);
cognitive psychology (Rumelhart, 1975); linguistics (Fillmore,
1975); motor performance (Schmidt, 1975); and several artificial
intelligence-cognitive psychology combinations (Bobrow & Norman,
1975; Schank & Abelson, 1975). It appears that the common issue
that motivated investigators to look for a new theory was a
desire to deal with "complex" tasks. The remarkable convergence
of new papers in the same year was probably due to the fact that
earlier versions of Minsky's important paper (1975) were widely
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circulated in the period just before 1975. It is also
interesting to note that every one of these papers makes explicit
reference to Bartlett's (1932) schema theory-this only a few
years after his major biographers had declared the theory to have
been a failure (Broadbent, 1970; Oldfield, 1972; Zangwill, 1972).
Ontological Assumptions
On the issue of the ontological status of schemas it is hard
to be sure what many schema theorists believe, and in those cases
where the issue is treated clearly there is little consensus.
Minsky (1975) and Rumelhart (1980) both define schemas as "data
structures," a phrase that certainly has the flavor of a
convenient notation to summarize the data (i.e.,
instrumentalism). Yet, the substance of both papers and
Rumelhart's title, "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition,"
certainly suggest they have more realist leanings. Neisser
(1976) apparently takes a realist position and considers schemas
to be physiological entities. He states, "a schema is a part of
the nervous system. It is some active array of physiological
structures and processes" (p. 54). Anderson (1981) takes a
strong instrumentalist position. He suggests that the only
solution to this problem is to "postulate some set of internal
structures and processes that are consistent with the data and
don't worry about unique identifiability" (p. 122). Problems
concerning the status of theoretical entities are difficult for
any science (Suppe, 1977); however, the issue seems particularly
acute in current cognitive psychology, since theories must find a
solution for the treatment of psychological entities (e.g.,
images, intentions, thoughts, and unconscious mental processes)
and for constructs borrowed from the area of artificial
intelligence (e.g., data structures, nodes, arcs, and networks).
See Pylyshyn (1978) and Thagard (1982) for a discussion of some
of these problems.
Schema theories can be distinguished from information
processing theories by one crucial characteristic--all schema
theories reject the atomistic assumption. Schema theorists
assume that there are some phenomena that cannot be accounted for
by a concatenation of smaller theoretical constructs and that it
is necessary to develop larger theoretical entities to deal with
these phenomena. Aside from this one attribute, schema theories
vary widely in the specific structures postulated and the
theoretical emphasis given to particular problems. In order to
display some of the overall properties of modern schema theories
we will focus on two of the more general accounts of schemas--
those of Minsky (1975) and Rumelhart (Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart
& Ortony, 1977).
Minsky's Theory
Minsky (1975) is very clear about the rejection of the
atomistic assumption. In the first two sentences of his paper he
criticizes earlier theories for being "too minute, /and/ local"
and argues that theories of the higher mental processes "ought to
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be larger" (p. 211). The notion of a "larger" theory is hard to
explicate purely in terms of the theoretical entities themselves.
There is an additional assumption in the reasoning. This
approach implicitly assumes that there are "larger phenomena" and
larger theories are actually theories that deal with these
phenomena. The nature of these "larger phenomena" can be seen
from the examples given in Minsky's paper: perception of
objects, perception of places, comprehension of discourse,
comprehension of actions, and carrying out actions.
Minsky also states that the new theoretical constructs must
contain more structure than those of earlier theories. He then
goes on to provide some specific proposals about the type of
structure needed. He introduces the construct of the frame (a
type of schema in the terminology of this paper). A frame has
fixed "nodes" that provide its basic structure. It has "slots"
that can be filled by specific information from the environment.
This provides additional structure, since a slot will only accept
a particular class of instances. If there is no information to
the contrary the slots are filled with "default assignments."
With this type of theoretical machinery applied to knowledge
about rooms, one could give an account of the following
phenomena: (a) Someone walking into a room without a ceiling
will be surprised. (b) People will not be able to understand the
sentence "The ceiling is made of passive transformations." (c)
Someone who had just been in a room might state that they had
seen the ceiling when eye movement recordings showed that they
never looked up high enough to see the ceiling. (d) If asked to
guess what a ceiling is made of, people will be much more likely
to guess plaster than glass. (e) In a recall study some of the
people who had been in a room with acoustic tile on the ceiling
will recall that the room had a plaster ceiling (cf. Brewer &
Treyens, 1981).
Minsky's theory was, in some sense, intended to be both a
psychological theory and a theory in artificial intelligence.
For the purposes of this chapter we have emphasized the
psychological side of the theory. As a theory in artificial
intelligence, the general outline Minsky supplied in his paper
has been articulated in much greater detail (e.g., Bobrow &
Winograd, 1977; Charniak, 1977). There are very thoughtful
discussions of Minsky's theory, the relation of frames to
propositions, and the implications of these issues for the
philosophy of science in Thagard (1980, 1982).
Rumelhart's Theory
Rumelhart has provided a specific schema theory for the
structure of stories (1975, 1977) and several papers on the
general nature and functions of schemas (Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977; Rumelhart, 1980). We will focus on his general
characterization of schemas. Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) clearly
reject the atomistic assumption and explicitly point out that it
is the attempt to handle all levels of abstraction including
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"higher level conceptualizations" (pp. 109-110) that most clearly
distinguishes schema theories from earlier information processing
models. They state that "schemata are data structures for
representing the generic concepts stored in memory" (p. 101).
Rumelhart and Ortony follow Minsky in postulating that schemas
have variables with constraints and that the variables have
default values or, to be more precise, a distribution of possible
default values. They point out that schemas are frequently
defined in terms of other schemas ("schemata embed"). Thus,
one's schema for an office building might include an office
schema as a subpart. The office schema could function as a
schema in its own right with a typewriter schema as a subpart,
and the typewriter schema could function as a schema with keys as
a subpart. In a more recent paper on schemas, Rumelhart (1980)
emphasizes that schemas are active in the ways that procedures
and parsers are active processes in computer programs.
In addition to the general characterization of schemas
outlined above, Rumelhart has articulated some of the functions
of schemas. In particular, he has attempted to clarify the
interactions among the incoming episodic information, the generic
information in the schema, and the specific nature of output.
Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) state that "once an assignment of
variable has been made, either from the environment, from memory,
or by default, the schema is said to have been instantiated" (p.
105). These ideas are then used to develop a theory of the
memory process. Rumelhart and Ortony suggest that what gets
stored in memory is an instantiated schema and that during the
process of recall generic schema information may be used to
further interpret and reconstruct a particular memory from the
original instantiated schema record. In applying these ideas to
the process of text comprehension, Rumelhart and Ortony focus on
the interaction of "top down" schema information and "bottom up"
text information. If a reader arrives at the schema intended by
the author the text has been correctly comprehended. If the
reader can find no schema to accept the text information the text
is not comprehended. If the reader finds a schema, but not the
one intended by the author, the text is misinterpreted.
Modern Schema Theory: Summary
Now having used Minsky's and Rumelhart's schema theories to
instantiate modern schema theory, we will contrast the general
characteristics of modern schema theory with the classic
assumptions of British Empiricism. Clearly the major defining
characteristic of schema theory is its rejection of the atomistic
assumption. All schema theorists adopt what we will call the
molar assumption. They assume that a schema theory needs to
postulate "larger" theoretical entities and that these molar
theoretical entities operate as units in the theory (cf.
Anderson, 1980, p. 143; Charniak, 1977, p. 359; Minsky, 1975, p.
215; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 106). A somewhat more extreme
form of anti-atomism would be to argue that schema theories not
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only need molar theoretical entities, but that these molar
entities are qualitatively different from the smaller atomic
entities in the theory. We will call this the assumption of
"emergent levels." This issue is very similar to the debate
about "mental chemistry" within the British Empiricist tradition.
Thus, James Mill took a pure atomistic position and assumed that
the more complex aspects of the mind were derived from different
groupings of the basic mental atoms. However, his son, John
Stuart Mill, adopted the emergent levels position and argued that
the smaller mental atoms formed qualitatively new mental
structures through the mental equivalence of chemical operations
(see Boring, 1950, and Mandler & Mandler, 1964, for a discussion
of this issue). Anderson (1981, p. 147) makes an explicit
argument against the hypothesis of emergent levels. Most schema
theorists have not overtly addressed this issue, but it seems to
us that the decision to introduce new theoretical entities
(frames, problem-solving schemas, etc.) is frequently an implicit
acceptance of the hypothesis of emergent levels.
The desire for parsimony is the one characteristic of the
British Empiricist paradigm that seems to us is still accepted in
modern schema theory. An analysis of these theories gives the
impression that many theorists are attempting to employ a
particular kind of theoretical entity such as frames (Minsky,
1975), scripts (Abelson, 1981), or propositions (Anderson, 1981)
and use them to account for as wide a range of phenomena as
possible.
The issue of associationism does not appear to be a live
issue in schema theory. It seems highly unlikely that any schema
theorists would think of themselves as "neo-associationists" as
did Anderson and Bower (1973). The intellectual challenge has
shifted from attempting to show that associations can handle
everything to attempting to create some form of explicit
theoretical machinery powerful enough to deal with the obvious
capacities of the human mind (cf. Chomsky, 1965, p. 58 for a
similar argument with respect to language acquisition).
One of the obvious characteristics of schema theories is the
free use of generic and abstract theoretical constructs. In
fact, one might want to argue that in some versions of schema
theory the focus on generic information has been so strong that
it is hard for the theories to deal with particular information.
For example, at one point Neisser states that "perceivers pick up
only what they have schemata for" (1976, p. 80).
Schema theories have worked hard to try and give an account
of the apparently active aspects of human cognition. Minsky's
(1975) frame theory, as originally presented, is more passive
than are most other schema theories. However, Goldstein and
Papert (1977) introduce the notion of "frame keepers" to deal
with some of the more active aspects of the functioning of
schemas. Rumelhart's 1980 modification of the earlier Rumelhart
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and Ortony (1977) approach was an attempt to suggest some general
techniques (procedures, parsers) for making schemas more active.
Neisser's (1976) schema theory stands out from other recent
proposals in that he not only treats the active aspects of
schemas, but makes it their most important characteristic.
Typically, the theoretical machinery included in schema
theories to deal with the active aspects of cognition also has a
purposive flavor. Neisser's (1976) theory puts a strong emphasis
on this issue. He states, "schemata are anticipations, they are
the medium by which the past affects the future" (p. 22).
Schema theories have clearly recognized the problem of the
•enerativity of cognitive processes (Minsky, 1975, p. 248;
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 112) and have made some suggestions
about how to deal with this difficult issue. However, one has
the feeling that most of these proposals are better discussions
of the problem than successful solutions.
Bartlett and Modern Schema Theory
It is interesting to compare Bartlett's schema theory with
the more recent schema theories. In terms of underlying
motivation and overall structure the older schema theory and the
newer schema theories are very close. Thus, Bartlett wanted a
theory that emphasized the role of old knowledge and that dealt
with molar cognitive phenomenon. He proposed a theory of
organized generic schemas that function in a generative, active,
and purposive fashion. Through the influences of linguistics,
information processing psychology, and artificial intelligence,
modern schema theory has been able to develop more detailed and
analytic accounts of the structure of schemas. In addition,
these influences have enabled modern schema theory to more
successfully deal with abstract, active, and generative
theoretical entities. In recognizing the problem of accounting
for specific personal memories within the framework of a schema
theory Bartlett's position may actually be somewhat in advance of
modern schema theories. On the particular issue of
reconstructive memory, modern theories have not taken the totally
reconstructive approach of Bartlett's "official" theory, but have
developed partially reconstructive accounts that closely resemble
Bartlett's "unofficial" theory. In summary, modern schema
theories are very similar to Bartlett's theory, but have
clarified, elaborated, and refined many aspects of his theory.
Information Processing Psychology and Modern Schema Theory
If one compares modern schema theory with information
processing psychology on their basic theoretical assumptions, the
overall intellectual trends are obvious (see Table 1). Schema
theories are closer to the Continental side on these issues. The
most striking difference between schema theories and information
processing theories is the rejection of the atomistic assumption.
On those issues where information processing psychology has
shifted toward the Continental position schema theories have
moved even more clearly and more firmly into the Continental
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 33
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 34
camp. The only major British Empiricist assumption retained by
schema theory is the assumption of parsimony.
The Nature of Schemas
Ontological Assumptions
In this section we will discuss what we think schemas are.
We believe a straightforward realist view is the correct way to
approach the issue of the ontological status of schemas. We
think that schema theories are theories about schemas and that
schemas are the unconscious cognitive structures and processes
that underlie human knowledge and skills. We believe that these
mental entities have a physiological base, but that in the
ultimate scientific account of things it will always be necessary
to provide a scientific explanation at the level of mental
entities (cf. Fodor, 1968; Putnam, 1973). We reject the
instrumentalist option (Anderson, 1976, 1978) on a variety of
grounds: (a) It seems inconsistent with our view that our goal
as scientists is to search for Truth. (b) There are good
arguments for realism (Suppe, 1977). (c) Realism has worked very
well in the mature sciences. (d) As cognitive psychology matures
it seems quite likely that there will be enough theoretical,
empirical, aesthetic, and pragmatic constraints on our theories
to undercut the indeterminacy arguments.
On the issue of the size of the mental "elements" we clearly
favor the molar position. However, we think schema theories
should explicitly adopt the more extreme view of emergent levels.
It seems to us that in human cognition there truly are emergent
phenomena. Thus, in trying to give a scientific account of a
spoken story, there are qualitatively different phenomena
occurring at the level of the phonemes, at the level of syntax,
and at the level of the plot; and it will require qualitatively
different types of theories to deal with the different levels.
Therefore we think the view that molar theories are simply sets
of smaller elements operating as units is incorrect.
Modularity
The one tenet of British Empiricism that schema theories
have not abandoned is the assumption of parsimony. We think that
schema theories ought to make a clean sweep of the British
Empiricist assumptions and adopt a liberal approach to
postulating theoretical entities. It simply does not seem to us
that a schema theory with a single schema construct can deal with
the human abilities to: (a) understand a passage of expository
text; (b) hit a tennis ball; (c) remember the shape of a leaf;
(d) speak a sentence; and (e) remember the plot of a movie.
Thus, we adopt the position that the mind is modular and that it
will be necessary to develop different types of theoretical
entities to account for the different cognitive processes (see
Chomsky, 1980, for a similar argument). We realize that
parsimony is an aesthetically pleasing attribute of a scientific
theory and agree that it would be pleasing to find a parsimonious
theory that accounted for all of the above phenomena. However,
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given the current primitive state of schema theory, the assertion
that a single type of theoretical entity can deal with all of the
molar cognitive processes is just contrary to the facts.
It seems to us, that if one examines specific schema
theories instead of general theoretical statements about schemas,
that the many differences in the theoretical entities used in
these specific theories is not in keeping with the parsimony
assumption, but instead supports the modularity hypothesis.
There appear to be strong similarities for the specific theories
within a domain or module, but qualitative differences across
domains. For example: scripts (Abelson, 1981; Graesser &
Nakamure, 1982); plans (Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980; Schmidt,
Sridharan, & Goodson, 1978); scene schemas (Brewer & Treyens,
1981; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977); and motor schemas (Schmidt,
1975). Note also the recent theoretical controversy over the
nature of story schemas (Black & Wilensky, 1979; Brewer &
Lichtenstein, 1981, 1982; Mandler & Johnson, 1980). Brewer and
Lichtenstein (1981, 1982) have argued that the story schemas
proposed by researchers in the story grammar tradition (Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke, 1977) have
actually been theories of the plan schemas that underlie the
goal-directed behavior of the characters in narratives. Brewer
and Lichtenstein argue that a theory of the story schema must
contain theoretical constructs that deal with the discourse
organizations that lead to particular affective states (1981,
1982), and must capture culture-specific literary conventions
(Brewer, in press). If Brewer and Lichtenstein are correct, then
one needs very different types of theories to deal with goal-
directed behavior and with the structure of stories. Thus,
overall it seems to us that in the actual practice of
constructing specific schema theories one finds considerable
support for the modularity position.
Ecological Validity
Many schema theorists have made arguments in favor of
"ecological validity" (e.g., Bartlett, 1932, pp. 17, 47; Brewer &
Treyens, 1981, p. 207; and Neisser, 1976, for a very strong
form). The general approach has been to assert that cognitive
psychology should not study narrow laboratory tasks, but should
study tasks that occur in real life. In the course of developing
the analysis of schema theory outlined above, we have come to
believe that the argument for ecological validity is not correct
as usually stated. It is not that studies of phenomena from
everyday life are somehow intrinsically better than narrow
laboratory studies. Instead we think the intuition behind the
ecological validity position derives from the issues of emergent
levels and modularity of mind. If one accepts the argument for
emergent levels and/or the modularity thesis, then focusing on a
few narrow laboratory tasks becomes a highly dangerous research
strategy. If either of these two assumptions is true, then no
matter how much effort is put into the study of nonsense
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syllables or eyelid conditioning it cannot ever result in a
comprehensive theory of the mind. On the other hand, if one
adopts the research strategy of studying a wide range of everyday
tasks, one is much more likely to find phenomena from
qualitatively different levels or from different cognitive
domains. Thus, the research strategy of focusing on ecologically
valid tasks should not be driven by the everyday nature of the
task (clearly one can learn much about the mind from some narrow
laboratory tasks), but by the recognition of the research
implications of accepting the emergent levels and modularity
positions. Bartlett worked out part of this logic in his
introductory section on methodology (1932, pp. 2-7).
Phenomenal Experience
A final issue that we think needs to be addressed by schema
theory is the relationship between schemas and phenomenal
experience. It is clear why this problem has been avoided. For
the earlier behaviorists there was no problem, since they
explicitly excluded the data of phenomenal experience from a
science of behavior. The main focus of information processing
psychologists was on unconscious mental processes. Therefore
they tended to ignore the data of phenomenal experience, or to
argue that the experience itself was of little interest to
information processing psychology as compared to the underlying
unconscious cognitive processes (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1973). Schema
theorists have also focused on the unconscious mental processes
of the schema and ignored the problems of consciousness and
phenomenal experience (e.g., Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Minsky
(1975) discusses the problems of imagery and consciousness at
various points in his frame paper, but never explicitly related
these issues to the frame construct. The one schema theorist who
was an exception to this trend is Bartlett. He concerned himself
with these problems at length in his book (1932), and he was
particularly concerned with trying to work out a solution to the
apparent inconsistency between his pure reconstructive schema
theory and the particular experiences that are involved in
personal memories (see the discussion of Bartlett in the first
section of this paper).
In a recent paper Brewer and Pani (1983) bite the bullet on
this issue. They argue that an ultimate scientific psychology
must account for the data from phenomenal experience, just as it
must account for the data of performance. If, for example, the
data from experience and from performance on some task are
"inconsistent" one does not throw out the pehnomenal data because
it is somehow less scientific. Instead the science of psychology
must aspire to explain all of the data. As an example of the
problem in the area of memory, Brewer and Pani (1982, in
preparation) show striking differences in the phenomenal reports
of imagery for different types of memory tasks. They argue that
a complete theory of memory must give an account of this
experiential data in addition to the usual memory performance
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data. The general issue of the relation of conscious and
unconscious processes is a pervasive one for cognitive
psychology. We will discuss three examples that relate directly
to schema theory.
Personal memory. First is the problem of personal memory.
There is an apparent tension between schema theories and the
experience of personal memory. Schema theories focus on generic
knowledge and the schematization of incoming episodic
information. Yet when one has a personal memory (e.g., "Where
were you the last time you spent cash for something?") there is a
strong phenomenal experience of imagery and the imagery appears
to contain "irrelevant" details of the original experience.
Clearly, as Bartlett recognized, schema theory must deal with
this problem (see Brewer & Pani, 1983, and Neisser, 1982, for
somewhat different ways of approaching this issue).
Generic images. A second problem is that of generic images.
Many types of generic knowledge processes appear to operate with
little concomitant phenomenal experience (e.g., "What is the
opposite of falsehood?"). However, repetitive experience with
visual perceptual information leads to generic knowledge
structures that have strong visual image properties (e.g., "What
hand does the Statue of Liberty hold the torch in?"). How is
this fact to be dealt with in schema theory? One could say that
the true schema in these cases is an unconscious generic
structure and that the phenomenal experience is an epiphenomenon.
One could take a strong imagist view and say that the phenomenal
experience is the schema. Or one could say that it is necessary
to postulate both an underlying unconscious schema and a
phenomenally accessible generic mental image (cf. Brewer & Pani,
1983). For our purpose here, it is not important to decide which
of these is the correct view. The point is, that schema theory
must overtly address this type of issue.
Procedural information. A final example is the strong
phenomenal experience that accompanies the transfer of procedural
knowledge into semantic knowledge [two examples: (a) "What is
the 8th letter of the alphabet?"; (b) "What finger do you use to
type 'r' with?"]. The difference in phenomenal experience is
striking. When a skilled task (motor, cognitive, or rote
linguistic) is carried out there is little or no phenomenal
experience of imagery. Yet, in order to answer a propositional
question about the information contained in the procedure there
is a strong experience of imagery (cf. Brewer & Pani, 1983).
Clearly, the problem is to explain these facts. Why are the
production schemas normally unconscious? Why does the
propositional task give rise to powerful imagery experiences?
Does one want to say that the imagery is causal in the
performance of the task?
It seems to us that examples such as these lead to an
obvious conclusion. Schema theory must take the data from
phenomenal experience seriously and schema theory must be
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articulated so that there is a graceful fit of the facts from
phenomenal experience. These are difficult problems and we
cannot provide solutions here, but we do have a suggestion as to
the direction of theory development. Perhaps one can adopt the
position that the schema structures and the processes operating
on the structures are unconscious, but that the products of these
operations are conscious. This is similar to a position taken by
Lashley (1960) and, of course, somewhat similar to Bartlett's
discussion of these issues. The type of conscious product seems
specific to the particular cognitive domain involved. Thus, the
memory processes relating to particular perceptual inputs seem to
give rise to modality specific imagery (e.g., visual imagery for
visual perceptual input), whereas the cognitive operations
involving abstract thoughts or practiced skills seem to give rise
to other types of nonimage conscious products (see Brewer & Pani,
1983, for further discussion).
Definition of Schema
In light of this analysis of schema theory, what are
schemas? Schemas are the unconscious mental structures and
processes that underlie the molar aspects of human knowledge and
skill. They contain abstract generic knowledge that has been
organized to form qualitative new structures. Schemas are
modular--different cognitive domains have schemas with different
structural characteristics. At input, schemas actively interact
with incoming episodic information. This interaction consists of
two basic processes: (a) the modification of the generic
knowledge in the relevant schema; (b) the construction of a
specific instantiated memory representation. An instantiated
schema is a cognitive structure that results from the interaction
of the old information of the generic schema and the new
information from the episodic input. The generic schema contains
some fixed structural relations and some slots that accept a
range of specific input information from the environment. The
unconscious operation of the schema gives rise to the specific
conscious contents of the mind. At output, generic production
schemas interact with new incoming information to allow
appropriate responses to an indefinite number of new situations.
In informal interactions with colleagues from the stimulus-
response and information processing traditions it is obvious that
they consider schema theory to be a vague and "soft-headed"
theory. Why is that? We think that there are several reasons
that derive from the world view of the critics and several
reasons that derive from the current status of schema theory.
The first cause of this attribution is, of course, the result of
the wholesale adoption of the Continental position by schema
theory. From the British Empiricist point of view the
Continental position has always seems vague and soft-headed. The
second reason is a matter of temperament in theory construction
(not unrelated to the Empiricist-Rationalist issue). Some
theorists prefer a precise, completely worked-out theory even if
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it is obviously wrong. Other theorists prefer a theory that is
not obviously false, even if this means having only a sketch of
an account of the phenomena at hand. Herbert Feigl once referred
to this difference in scientific temperament as the great split
between the "nothing but" theorists and the "something more"
theorists. Clearly schema theory falls in the "something more"
camp.
The other two reasons for the perception of schema theory as
vague arise from true problems with the theories in their current
stage of development. First, the attempt to hold to the ideal of
parsimony has caused problems in trying to give a general
characterization of the nature of schemas. If one rejects the
parsimony assumption and accepts the arguments for modularity,
then a general account of schemas must look vague. Such an
account can only focus on the characteristics that the general
class of molar cognitive structures have in common, and so cannot
be too precise without running up against obvious
counterexamples. On the other hand, consistent with the
modularity thesis, it is much harder to accuse specific schema
theories in particular domains of being vague compared to other
theories in psychology (Graesser & Nakamure, 1982; Lichtstnstein &
Brewer, 1980; Rumelhart, 1977). Finally, it is obvious that
modern schema theory is still immature and in need of further
development (see Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980, for a similar
analysis). Clearly, there is much work ahead in this area. In
fact, there are some really hard problems for schema theory that
we have not even mentioned. For example: How do schemas
develop? How does incoming information activate an appropriate
schema? What are the correct structures for schemas in different
cognitive domains? Nevertheless, even in its current state of
development, it seems to us that schema theory is one of the
important currents in psychology and the larger cognitive science
community. In keeping with this discussion of schema theory we
will attempt, in the last section of this chapter, to articulate
and make more precise one aspect of schema theory--the role of
schemas in the memory process.
The Functions of Schemas in the Memory Process
Basic Schema Findings
First we will examine a set of basic empirical findings in
the study of human memory that set the stage for our analysis.
It is experimental results such as these that seem to require a
schema theory account of human memory. We will refer to the
results of these experiments as the "basic schema findings."
Memory with and without schemas. There are a great variety
of different experiments which can be used to show that
information which can be instantiated in a schema is better
recalled than information which cannot easily be instantiated in
a schema. In fact, the very first experiment on human memory
shows this effect. Ebbinghaus (1885/1964) found that recall for
information from a lyric poem was about ten times better than
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recall of nonsense material. By 1937 there had been many
experiments on this issue, all leading to the general conclusion
that recall of meaningful material was much better than recall of
meaningless material (Welborn & English, 1937). In these older
experiments the meaningful materials are very different from the
meaningless materials along many dimensions. In more recent
times, experimenters have found techniques to show the schema
effect with materials in which the basic elements are the same,
or even with the use of only a single passage to yield the schema
effects. Examples of modern studies showing that recall is
better for material which can be instantiated in a schema are:
(a) standard text vs. scrambled text (Brent, 1969; Chiesi,
Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Lachman & Dooling, 1968; Thorndyke, 1977);
(b) picture before opaquely written passage vs. picture after the
passage (Bransford & Johnson, 1972); (c) title or theme before
opaquely written passage vs. after the passage (Bransford &
Johnson, 1972; Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Dooling & Mullet, 1973;
(d) recognition of organized pictures vs. disorganized pictures
(Mandler & Johnson, 1976; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977); (e) canonical
videotaped actions vs. scrambled actions (Lichenstein, 1979).
Subject knowledge and recall. Another way to show the
general effects of schemas is to compare the differences in
recall for subjects who come to the experiment with different
degrees of schema-based knowledge. The basic finding is that
subjects with a more developed schema for some body of knowledge
show higher recall for materials related to that knowledge.
Studies showing this effect include: recall of chess positions
by expert chess players vs. novice players (Chase & Simon, 1973);
recall of a baseball narrative by individuals with high and low
knowledge of baseball (Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979); recall of
narratives about Western and Australian Aboriginal medicine by
Western and Australian Aboriginal subjects (Steffensen & Colker,
1982).
Memory for schema-related information. One of Bartlett's
(1932) original findings dealing with the recall of text was that
information connected with the underlying theme or plot of the
passage was more likely to be recalled than was information not
connected to the theme. This basic finding, that schema-related
information will be recalled better than schema-unrelated
information, is a very robust finding and has been replicated
many times by a great number of researchers using a wide variety
of theories about the nature of the underlying schemas (Brewer &
Treyens, 1981; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1978; Gomulicki, 1956;
Goodman, 1980; Johnson, 1970; Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980;
Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Meyer & McConkie, 1973; Rumelhart, 1977;
Thorndyke, 1977).
Schemas and the Memory Process
The basic schema findings outlined above can be accounted
for by any of the schema theories discussed earlier. The ability
to deal with this body of experimental findings is one of major
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 47
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 48
reasons for the rapid development of schema theory in psychology
in recent years. However, it seems to us that accounting for
these basic schema findings is not enough. It is necessary to
develop much more explicit and precise theories about the
operation of schemas in the memory process. We will attempt to
work out a more detailed understanding of the role of schemas in
memory by focusing on two questions: (a) In a given memory task
how much of the subject's memory is due to generic schema
information and how much is due to episodic information? The
term "episodic" is not intended to carry any theoretical
implications, e.g., Tulving, 1972, but is merely a descriptive
term used to indicate the information actually obtained from the
environment during a particular exposure). (b) What are the
mechanisms through which schemas operate in the memory process?
We propose that there are five basic processes through which
schemas could operate during the memory process (these schema-
based operations are extensions of the processes outlined in
Brewer & Treyens, 1981): (a) Schemas could influence the amount
of attention allocated to a particular type of information, with
the assumption that more attention leads to better memory. (b)
Schemas could operate as a framework in memory that serves to
preserve incoming episodic information. (c) Generic schema
information could interact with incoming episodic information to
produce a memory representation that is a combination of old
generic information and new episodic information. (d) Schemas
could serve to guide retrieval processes in order to locate
episodic information in memory. (e) Schemas could operate to
influence what retained information a subject chooses to produce
in a memory task.
In the remainder of this section we will examine the
experimental literature to see if we can find unambiguous
evidence to support the position that schemas operate through the
mechanisms discussed above. Since the basic schema findings
could result from any of the five schema-based processes we will
attempt to use a substractive logic. For each set of data
discussed, we will try to show that the results must have been
due to a particular process because we can rule out all of the
other alternatives. Note that in our analysis we frequently
claim that a particular experiment supports positions quite
different from that proposed by the authors. We will work our
way through the five basic schema processes in the order given
above, and for each process we will treat experiments dealing
with linguistic materials first and those using nonlinguistic
materials second.
Attention
The basic assumption of the attention mechanism as applied
to memory is that increased amounts of attention lead to a
stronger memory trace. In order to relate this mechanism to
schema-based processes one has to work out t.e relation between
attention and schema-based information. Currently this is an
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 49
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 50
area of some confusion. A number of researchers have postulated
that schema-related information receives more attention than
schema-unrelated information (Bower, 1976; Cirilo & Foss, 1980;
Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). However, in direct contrast to this
position, a number of other researchers have postulated that
schema-related information receives less attention than schema-
unrelated information (Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Friedman, 1979).
Notice that a memory theory that only allows schemas to operate
via attention, and makes the assumption that schema-related
material receives less attention, cannot account for the basic
schema findings, since it would have to predict poorer recall for
schema-related material. However, as we will see, it is possible
to combine the hypothesis of less attention to schema-related
information with other schema-based memory processes to give an
account of the basic schema findings. Of all the schema-based
memory processes to be discussed the attention mechanism is the
hypothesis with the least amount of theoretical and empirical
consensus.
Linguistic materials. There are empirical studies with text
materials that support both positions on the schema-attention
issue. Cirilo and Foss (1980) find longer reading time (and thus
presumably more attention) for schema-related information, while
Shebilske and Reid (1979) find the reverse. This is too complex
an issue to analyze here, but it seems to us that the general
direction that must be taken is to provide a much more
sophisticated account of the interaction between the reader's
developing mental model and the structure of the text (see
Rumelhart, 1980). In dealing with text one has to take into
account the fact that the author has complete freedom to
manipulate the text structure by including, omitting, or
reordering any aspect of the underlying schema-based information
(see Brewer, 1980). Within this framework, a simple analysis
into schema-related information and schema-unrelated information
(or as frequently described, high in the text hierarchy and low
in the text hierarchy) probably does not cut the world in the
appropriate fashion. We will present a brief example to
illustrate the complexities of this issue. Imagine a story about
a racing car driver. First we, will examine schema-related
information: If the author has chosen to include in the text
schema-based information that is easily available from the
reader's schema then one might expect the reader to devote less
attention to it. For example, "The driver turned the steering
wheel to the right. The car went around the turn to the right."
However, for schema-related material that is informative about
the plot one would expect the reader to devote more attention,
e.g., "The accident had left a huge oil spill on the far turn."
Now we will examine schema-unrelated information: If the schema-
unrelated information is irrelevant to the plot, then one would
not expect readers to devote much attention to it, e.g., "The
driver put his candy wrapper in the trashcan." However, if the
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schema-unrelated information is inconsistent with the developing
mental model about an automobile race, then one would expect the
reader to devote considerable attention to the anomalous
information in order to try and instantiate it into the
developing mental model, e.g., "A man in the stands stood up,
pointed his finger at one of the cars, and it turned into a giant
Twinkie." Thus, while it appears that there are schema-based
attention processes, it also seems that a full analysis of
attention and schema relatedness will have to incorporate an
account of the relation of text information to schema
information, and an analysis of reading, that views the reader as
using text information to develop a mental model during the
course of reading the text.
Even though the current state of our knowledge about schema-
based attention processes is poorly developed, there is some
reason to believe that the attention process is not the major
determiner of the schema-based recall findings. A number of
studies using a variety of techniques have attempted to control
the attentional processes and have found that this has little
effect on schema-based memory findings (Britton, Meyer, Simpson,
Holdredge, & Curry, 1979; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyers, 1979;
Graesser, Nakamura, Zimmerman, & Riha, 1980; Johnson, 1970;
Reynolds, 1979).
Nonlinguistic materials. Several studies have examined the
number and duration of eye fixations on schema-related and
schema-unrelated information in viewing pictures. The general
finding is that subjects devote more attention to schema-
unrelated information (Friedman, 1979; Loftus & Mackworth, 1978).
Friedman's (1979) study makes an important distinction between
schema-irrelevant information and schema-inconsistent
information. She finds a strong initial effect of long fixations
for schema-inconsistent information and a small tendency for
schema-irrelevant information to have longer fixations than
schema-relevant information.
Overall, it appears that there is some agreement that
subjects direct attention to schema-inconsistent information. It
appears that the resolution of the issue of the amount of
attention directed at schema-relevant vs. schema-irrelevant
information may require that this dichotomy be replaced with a
much more complex, and perhaps domain-specific analysis of
reading text and of viewing the visual world.
Framework
The framework hypothesis states that schemas can serve as a
scaffolding to preserve schema-related episodic information. It
is easy to conceptualize this mechanism in terms of Minsky's
(1975) theory of a frame with slots that accept a range of
possible values. In these terms the framework view states that
instantiating a slot with a particular piece of episodic
information will tend to preserve the memory trace for that
information. The framework hypothesis predicts that new schema-
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related information will be better retained than new schema-
unrelated information. In order to show that this effect is due
to a preserved episodic trace one must rule out other schema-
based mechanisms such as integration or retrieval. Note that the
framework hypothesis, as stated, makes no assumption about the
level of information that is preserved by the framework. The
preserved episodic information could be fairly low-level
perceptual information ("surface information") or much more
abstract information.
Linguistic materials. The studies showing the effect of a
picture or title on the recall of an opaquely written passage
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Dooling & Lachman, 1971; Dooling &
Mullet, 1973) can be interpreted as supporting the framework
hypothesis. In these studies the subjects who received a schema-
envoking picture or title before they heard the passage showed
much better recall than subjects who received the picture or
title after they heard the passage. If the effect had been due
to old schema knowledge (integration) or to the schema operating
as a retrieval mechanism, then the subjects who received the
schema afterward could have used the schema to make inferences or
as a retrieval device just as well as the subjects who received
it first. Since the data show a large difference in recall
between the two conditions, it appears that the schema is
operating as a framework to preserve the episodic information
contained in the passage.
Another study that can be interpreted as support for the
framework hypothesis is a text recall study by Thorndyke (1977).
In this study Thorndyke compared recall for two types of embedded
goal-based passages, one with the superordinate goal at the
beginning and one with the superordinate goal at the end (in
texts of this kind, when the goal comes first the reader can
understand the purpose of a rather strange sequence of actions).
Recall was better for the group that received the goal at the
beginning of the passage, and through our subtractive logic we
interpret this finding to support the position that schemas can
act as a framework to preserve information from texts.
Nonlinguistic materials. There are a number of studies of
picture memory by Mandler (Mandler & Johnson, 1976; Mandler &
Parker, 1976; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977) which can be interpreted
as evidence for the action of schemas as frameworks to preserve
episodic picture information. Two types of pictures are used in
these studies--organized and unorganized. An organized picture
consists of a small number of schema-related objects spatially
arranged to make up a schema-consistent visual scene. The
unorganized pictures consist of the same objects rearranged to
give a schema-inconsistent visual scene (e.g., a desk in the
upper part of the picture not resting on any solid surface).
Memory for the information in the pictures (objects, spatial
relations) was tested with a recognition procedure in which the
foils for the organized pictures were changed from the original
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picture but were schema-consistent. In general, these studies
showed that recognition memory was better for organized pictures
than for unorganized pictures. The use of schema-consistent
foils eliminates the possibility that the subjects are responding
on the basis of generic knowledge, and the use of a recognition
memory procedure reduces or eliminates the use of schemas as
retrieval mechanisms, so we believe this finding can be used to
show that schemas operate as frameworks to preserve episodic
information.
Thus, overall we find that there is evidence from both
linguistic and nonlinguistic domains for schemas operating as
frameworks to preserve episodic information.
Integration
The integration hypothesis states that during the process of
schema instantiation old schema-based information becomes
integrated with new episodic information. Thus, the instantiated
memory representation will contain both generic information from
the schema and episodic information from the input. The
proportion of generic inrormation and episodic information will
vary with factors such as the type of schema and time interval
test. The most extreme form of integration would be the case
where all the episodic information was lost from memory so that
the memory response would be based completely on generic
information. ;f integration occurs, then ic will lead to
apparently better memory for schema-related information than for
schema-unrelated information since the memory for schema-related
material will actually be based on a mixture of generic schema
information and episodic information. When a subject gives
information in recall that comes from the generic schema and was
not in the episodic input, then we say that an inference has
occurred. The occurrence of schema-based inferences in a recall
task or false recognition responses to schema-related foils on a
recognition task is a qualitative indication that the process of
integration has occurred. And when this occurs one can be almost
certain that some proportion of the apparent episodic memory for
presented schema-related items actually derives from generic
schema knowledge. For the purposes of this general definition of
integration, it does not matter if the interaction of old and new
information occurs during comprehension or during testing or how
conscious the subject is of the integration process.
Linguistic materials. Evidence for integration in memory
for textual material is widespread. In one of the very first
text-memory experiments ever performed, Binet and Henri (1894;
translated in Thieman & Brewer, 1978) found examples of
integration. They noted, for example, that one child recalled
"for her animals" as "for her rabbits" and they argued that these
"errors of imagination" were obviously due to the child's
background knowledge. Bartlett (1932) also noted the process of
integration in his story recall data. He stated that he
deliberately chose to use somewhat unusual stories (Kathlamet
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Indian texts) as materials so that he could look for inferences
driven by the schemas that his English undergraduates brought to
bear on the texts. He obtained the expected data and gave as an
example the fact that one of his English subjects recalled
"paddling a canoe" (from the Kathlamet text) as "rowing a boat."
One of the first modern studies to focus on inferences in
text memory was the study of Sulin and Dooling (1974). In this
study subjects heard a passage and were later given a recognition
memory test. Some of the subjects were told that the passage was
about Helen Keller and these subjects showed a strong tendency
(after one week) to make false recognition responses to
nonpresented sentences such as one stating that the main
character was blind. In more recent times there have been a
number of studies of memory for script-based texts (Bower, Black,
& Turner, 1979; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll,
Kowalski, & Smith, 1980--reviewed in Graesser, 1981 and Graesser
& Nakamura, 1982). These studies have shown a very high rate of
script-based intrusions and false recognitions of script-based
foils. In one of these studies (Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, &
Smith, 1980), the researchers used the evidence of script-based
inferences to argue that much of the memory advantage for script-
related items at one week was due to script-based information and
not to episodic information. Another recent study showing
evidence for integration is the work of Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss
(1979) on memory for texts about baseball games. These
researchers found that subjects made many false recognition
responses to nonpresented items relating to the baseball schema.
A number of experiments have varied the retention interval
to study schema-based memory processes over time. These studies
have found that the integration effect becomes stronger over time
(van Dijk & Kintsch, 1978; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith,
1980; Spiro, 1977; Sulin & Dooling, 1974). Presumably, this
effect is due to the differential loss from memory of different
types of information. At immediate testing there is apparently
some retained information about the particular propositions from
the initial text. Over time, this type of "surface" information
is lost leaving the instantiated schema in memory, and after very
long time intervals much of the episodic information in the
instantiated schema may be lost, leaving predominantly generic
schema information.
Nonlinguistic materials. A series of recent studies provide
evidence for integration in memory tasks using visual perceptual
input. Jenkins, Wald, and Pittinger (1978) presented subjects
with a series of pictures that described an event. The subjects
showed a large number of false recognition responses to schema-
based items that belonged to the event but that had not been
shown in the original sequence. Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978)
have shown that giving subjects (false) verbal information about
an event previously seen by the subjects can lead subjects to
make false recognitioni responses to pictures that they have
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 59
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 60
never seen before. Brewer and Treyens (1981) obtained evidence
for integration in a naturalistic study of memory for rooms. The
subjects were asked to wait in an office briefly, on the pretext
that the experimental apparatus was not ready. Then the subjects
were taken to another location and given a series of recall and
recognition tests for information about the room. In recall the
subjects reported a number of objects that were not in the
experimental office. These inferred objects were all highly
related to the office schema. On a verbal recognition test
(e.g., "Did you see a typewriter?") there was a high positive
correlation between the schema-expectancy scores from a different
group of subjects and the verbal-recognition scores for
nonpresented items from the group of subjects who saw the room.
Since this correlation was based on recognition ratings of items
the subjects never actually saw, it must have been based on the
subject's office schema.
A series of experiments using nonlinguistic materials have
investigated the role of the retention interval in schema-based
integration processes. These studies, like the linguistic
studies discussed earlier, have shown that the integration effect
becomes stronger over time (Brewer & Dupree, 1983; Mandler &
Parker, 1976; Mandler & Ritchey, 1977). The explanation for
these effects is essentially like that proposed for the studies
using linguistic materials. Different types of information are
apparently lost from memory at different rates over time. Thus,
at short time intervals, there is some retained perceptual
information about the visual scene, and over time this specific
episodic information is lost and memory performance is
increasingly based on the instantiated schema and generic schema
information. Brewer and Dupree (1983) suggested that for
hierarchically organized plan schemas the information is lost
from the bottom up, leaving successively more abstract
information about plans and goals in memory at longer time
intervals.
Overall, there is much evidence for integration in memory
for both linguistic and nonlinguistic material. The size of the
effect seems to vary widely depending on the "strength" of the
particular schema. Thus, scripts seem particularly powerful in
producing inferences. In all of these domains there is a
tendency for integration to be much stronger at longer time
intervals. As the specific episodic information is lost over
time, the underlying generic information plays a larger role in
the memory task.
Retrieval
The retrieval hypothesis states that schemas may operate to
guide the memory search for schema-related episodic information.
This hypothesis predicts better recall of schema-related than of
schema-unrelated information. For a schema-related item and a
schema-unrelated item of equivalent memory-trace strength (as
tested by recognition memory) the retrieval hypothesis predicts
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that the schema-related item is more likely to be given in a free
recall task.
Linguistic materials. Two studies by Anderson and Pichert
(1978) and by Pichert and Anderson (1977) can be interpreted as
support for the use of schemas as retrieval devices. Subjects in
these studies read a text that could be viewed from two different
viewpoints (schemas). Thus, for example, one text was about a
house and its contents and could be viewed from the point of view
of a home buyer or a burglar. Subjects who took a particular
perspective (e.g., burglar) tended to recall more schema-related
information (e.g., location of the family silver). After recall
from one perspective, subjects were asked to recall the story a
second time from the other perspective, and under this schema-
based perspective, they recalled some of the now schema-related
information that had previously been schema-irrelevant. Thus, it
looks as if the perspective manipulation acts to
provide a schema-based retrieval plan. There have been other
interpretations of these findings (Wyer, Srull, Gordon, &
Hartwick, 1982).
Nonlinguistic materials. Lichtenstein and Brewer (1980)
carried out a series of studies showing that plan schemas have
powerful effects on the recall of goal-directed actions (i.e.,
actions that are part of a plan schema are recalled better than
actions that are not part of a plan schema). However,
Lichtenstein and Brewer only used recall measures which, by
themselves, are not sufficient to establish what mechanism was
producing the facilitation in recall for plan schema items.
Brewer and Dupree (1983) used a variety of recall and recognition
tasks to attempt to give a more analytic account of the findings
of Lichtenstein and Brewer (1980). They compared recall of
actions that were seen embedded in a plan schema (e.g., reached
up with a ruler to adjust the hands of a high clock) with the
same actions not embedded in a plan schema (e.g., reached up with
a ruler). They found that immediate recall for an action was
more than twice as good if it occurred in a plan schema.
However, they also found that on an immediate visual recognition
test the two types of actions were recognized equally well.
Thus, for actions equally well recognized many more of the
schema-related items were given on the recall task. Brewer and
Dupree argued that this pattern of results indicates that the
plan schemas were operating as a retrieval mechanism to allow
access to a greater portion of the plan-related episodic
information.
Brewer and Treyens (1981) have used similar logic to
investigate memory for places. For the objects in a room that
were strongly recognized in a verbal recognition task, the
schema-related objects were much more likely to have been written
down in recall than were schema-unrelated objects. Brewer and
Treyens argued that this result indicated that some of the better
recall for schema-related items must have been due to the office
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schema being used as a retrieval device. Thus, our analysis of
these studies indicates that schemas can function as retrieval
mechanisms.
Editing
The editing hypothesis states that schemas may operate
outside of the memory mechanism itself to determine which
information the subject chooses to communicate to the
experimenter. Thus, if the experimenter instructs the subject to
recall "just the basic ideas," the subject might use schema
knowledge to identify the schema-relevant information and choose
to write down only the schema-relevant information. This use of
schemas to edit memory output gives apparently better recall for
schema-related material.
Linguistic material. In terms of the actual experiments
there is evidence for schema-based editing, but it operates to
reduce recall of very high schema-related information. Graesser,
Woll, Kowalski, and Smith (1980) found that subjects in a script
generation task tended not to produce very typical script
actions. Brewer and Treyens (1981) argue that this type of
finding follows from an analysis of the recall task as one in
which the subject is communicating with the experimenter. The
subjects apparently are following a conversational maxim (Grice,
1975) that one should not tell someone information that is
completely obvious.
Within the story grammar tradition (Mandler, 1978; Mandler &
Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979) there is a recall finding
that can be given a similar interpretation. In producing texts
to fit particular theoretical models the researchers in this
tradition have often violated the maxim that an author should not
include in the text information that is obvious to the reader.
In particular, a number of story grammar researchers have
included in their texts a category called "reaction" or "internal
response" or "internal plan." By including these categories one
can obtain texts such as, "After the argument with his boss Joe
was angry /reaction/ so he decided to slam the door as he left
the office /internal plan/. He slammed the door as he left the
office," instead of the more natural, "After the argument with
his boss Joe slammed the door as he left the office." One of the
major empirical findings of the story grammar tradition (Mandler,
1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979) has been that
information relating to reactions or internal plans is very
frequently lost in story recall tasks. It seems to us that this
memory data is actually produced by the operation of schemas to
edit information that is redundant with the actions described in
the narratives (see Black & Wilensky, 1979; Brewer & Treyens,
1981, on communication; and van Dijk, 1980, p. 262, for further
discussion of this editing process in recall tasks),
Nonlinguistic materials. Brewer and Treyens (1981) found
evidence that schemas were being used to edit out some of the
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very high schema-related information in their naturalistic room
memory study. Subjects rarely recalled information such as, "the
room had a ceiling," since this very high schema-related
information can be assumed for any room.
Overall, it is clear that schemas can operate to edit the
information that is recalled. It may be that the editing
procedure is sometimes used to edit out schema-unrelated
information (in fact, if the demand characteristics for total
recall are not too severe, one would think that a principle of
least effort would tend to produce some editing of schema-
unrelated information). However, the current experimental
findings suggest schema-based editing serves to eliminate very
high schema-related information, and thus this process operates
in a direction opposed to the basic schema findings.
Functions of Schemas in Memory
Our analysis of the literature suggests that there is
evidence for schemas operating in all five schema-based
processes. Schemas have been shown to affect memory through
attention processes, through acting as a framework to preserve
episodic information, through integration of old and new
knowledge, through a retrieval process, and through an output
editing process. While the evidence is not completely clear, it
would appear that the basic schema findings are due to a mixture
of: schemas operating as a framework to preserve schema-related
information; schemas operating to integrate old schema-based
information with new episodic information to give the appearance
of increased memory for schema-based episodic information; and
schemas operating in retrieval to facilitate the location of
schema-related information. Currently the evidence does not
suggest that schemas operating to direct attention or operating
as output editors are major factors in the memory process.
Memory for Schema-Related and Schema-Unrelated Information
A number of researchers have pointed out that there appear
to be some major inconsistencies in schema theory approaches to
the issue of memory for schema-related and schema-unrelated
information (e.g., Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). In this last
section we would like to formulate the problem, and attempt to
use the framework developed earlier to resolve some of the
apparently conflicting data. The basic problem is that there are
a number of studies that do not give the basic schema effects
described earlier in the paper. Thus, some studies of script
memory (Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll,
Kowalski, & Smith, 1980) and some studies of picture memory
(Friedman, 1979) find memory for schema-unrelated information to
be better than memory for schema-related information.
Recall versus recognition. The first step in working out
these problems is to distinguish the type of memory test
involved. There is essentially total agreement that for recall
tasks the basic schema effect is found: schema-related
information is better recalled than schema-unrelated information.
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In terms of our analysis this general finding is due to the
powerful schema-based processes of integration and retrieval
during recall.
However, for recognition memory the studies give apparently
mixed results. Thus, some experiments with text found that
recognition memory for schema-related information is better
(Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979) while other experiments found that
recognition for schema-related information is worse (Graesser,
Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1980).
There is a similar divergence in results for studies using
recognition memory and nonlinguistic materials. Some studies
found that recognition memory for schema-related material is
better (Brewer & Dupree, 1983; Goodman, 1980) while other studies
find it to be worse (Friedman, 1979). Some of these difficulties
can be resolved by taking into account the time interval for
test, the types of "schema-unrelated" information used, and the
relative contributions of episodic and generic information.
Delay of memory test. Within the set of studies on the
schema-related/schema-unrelated issue there is a tendency for
memory tasks that use relatively short time intervals to find
schema-unrelated information to be equal or better than schema-
related information (Brewer & Dupree, 1983; Friedman, 1979;
Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979), whereas memory tasks that
involve a longer time interval tend to show schema-related
information recognized better than schema-unrelated (Brewer &
Dupree, 1983; Goodman, 1980; Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith,
1980). Thus, it appears that part of the apparent conflict
between these studies is due to good recognition for "surface"
information after short time intervals and the loss of this
information after longer time intervals, leading to an advantage
for schema-based information. While this analysis accounts for
much of the conflicting data, there still remains some
theoretical and empirical disagreement about the strength of the
episodic memory trace for schema-related and schema-unrelated
information.
Relative contributions of episodic and generic information.
In attempting to analyze the results of experiments in this area,
one should also use the analysis of the different types of memory
processes to distinguish the relative contribution of episodic
and generic information in a particular experiment. Bower,
Black, and Turner (1979) found that script-relevant items were
better recalled than script-irrelevant items, whereas in direct
contrast Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, and Smith (1980) arrived at
the opposite conclusion. The difference between these studies is
that Bower, Black, and Turner (1979) based their conclusion on
the overall correct recall data, which included contributions of
both episodic and generic information. On the other hand,
Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, and Smith (1980) used the intrusion
rate to estimate the amount of generic information. Then they
subtracted this estimate from the overall correct recall to
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obtain an estimate of the amount of episodic information. If one
combines the data in the Graesser study for both episodic and
generic contributions, the overall recall data are in good
agreement with the Bower data. Thus, in attempting to compare
studies in this area one must be careful to analyze the findings
in terms of the relative contributions of episodic and generic
information.
Type of schema-related and schema-unrelated information. A
final factor to be considered is the nature of the schema-
unrelated information in these studies. As discussed earlier,
one must distinguish between schema-irrelevant information and
schema-inconsistent information. For schema-irrelevant versus
schema-relevant information it still seems to us that there is
some conflict, both in theory and in data, that cannot be
accounted for by our analysis. We clearly need more detailed
experiments to determine what the strength of the memory trace is
for these types of information in different domains. For schema-
inconsistent information the issue seems simpler. Most theorists
who have explicitly discussed this type of information have
hypothesized that it will show high recognition and perhaps high
recall. The usual line of reasoning is that much attention will
be devoted to schema-inconsistent information, leading to a
stronger memory trace, and also that possibly more effort will be
devoted to attempting to force schema instantiation, thus giving
rise to a more elaborated memory representation. There is some
experimental evidence to support these assumptions (Bower, Black,
& Turner, 1979; Friedman, 1979).
Conclusion
We think that an understanding of how new knowledge
interacts with old knowledge will play a major role in the
development of a scientific theory of the human mind. In this
paper we have attempted to show how schema theory has been
formulated to deal with the relationships between old and new
knowledge. We have argued that the rise of schema theory
represents a continuation of a general trend in the study of the
mind away from the assumptions of British Empiricism toward those
of Continental philosophy. We have proposed that an
understanding of the mind will require a number of very different
types of schema theories and have pointed out the problems
involved in relating the unconscious mental structures and
processes of the schema to the phenomena of conscious experience.
Finally, we have attempted to develop a more explicit account of
the operations of schemas in the memory process and reanalyze the
experimental literature in terms of this framework. Our analysis
suggests that schema-based processes operate to: (a) direct
attention, (b) serve as a framework to preserve episodic
information, (c) combine generic information with episodic
information to form instantiated schema memory representations,
(d) act as a retrieval mechanism in recall, and (e) act as a
mechanism to edit memory output.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 71
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 72
References
Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script
concept. American Psychologist, 36, 715-729.
Anderson, J. R. (1976). Language, memory, and thought.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Anderson, J. R. (1978). Arguments concerning representations for
mental imagery. Psychological Review, 85, 249-277.
Anderson, J. R. (1980). On the merits of ACT and information-
processing psychology: A response to Wexler's review.
Cognition, 8, 73-88.
Anderson, J. R. (1981). Concepts, propositions, and schemata:
What are the cognitive units? In H. E. Howe, Jr., & J. H.
Flowers (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 26).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Anderson, J. R., & Bower, G. H. (1973). Human associative memory.
Washington, D.C.: V. H. Winston.
Anderson, R. C., & Pichert, J. W. (1978). Recall of previously
unrecallable information following a shift in perspective.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 1-12.
Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory: A
proposed system and its control processes. In K. W. Spence
& J. T. Spence (Eds.), The psychology of learning and
motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 2). New
York: Academic Press.
Bartlett, F. C. (1916). An experimental study of some problems of
perceiving and imaging. British Journal of Psychology, 8,
222-266.
Bartlett, F. C. (1920). Some experiments on the reproduction of
folk-stories. Folklore, 31, 30-47.
Bartlett, F. C. (1921). The functions of images. British Journal
of Psychology, 11, 320-337.
Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. London: Cambridge
University Press.
Bartlett, F. C. (1935). Remembering. Scientia, 52, 221-226.
Bartlett, F. C. (1936). Autobiography. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A
history of psychology in autobiography (Vol. 3). Worcester,
MA: Clark University Press.
Binet, A., & Henri, V. (1894). La memoire des phrases (Memoire
des idees). L'Anee Psychologique, 1, 24-59.
Black, J. B., & Wilensky, R. (1979). An evaluation of story
grammars. Cognitive Science, 3, 213-230.
Bobrow, D. G., & Norman, D. A. (1975). Some principles of memory
schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.),
Representation and understanding. New York: Academic Press.
Bobrow, D. G., & Winograd, T. (1977). An overview of KLR, a
knowledge representation language. Cognitive Science, 1, 3-
46.
Boring, E. G. (1950). A history of experimental psychology (2nd
ed.). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 73
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 74
Bower, G. H. (1976). Experiments on story understanding and
recall. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 28,
511-534.
Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in
memory for text. Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177-220.
Bransford, J. D., & Johnson, M. K. (1972). Contextual
prerequisites for understanding: Some investigations of
comprehension and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 11, 717-726.
Brent, S. G. (1969). Linguistic unity, list length, and rate of
presentation in serial anticipation learning. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 8, 70-79
Brewer, W. F. (1980). Literary theory, rhetoric, and stylistics:
Implications for psychology. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, &
W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading
comprehension: Perspectives from cognitive psychology,
linguistics, artificial intelligence, and education.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brewer, W. F. (in press). The story schema: Universal and
culture-specific properties. In D. Olson, N. Torrance, & A.
Hildyard (Eds.), Literacy, language, and learning: The
nature and consequences of reading and writing. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Brewer, W. F., & Dupree, D. A. (1983). Use of plan schemata in
the recall and recognition of goal-directed actions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 9, 117-129.
Brewer, W. F., & Lichtenstein, E. H. (1981). Event schemas, story
schemas, and story grammars. In J. Long & A. Baddeley
(Eds.), Attention and performance IX. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Brewer, W. F., & Lichtenstein, E. H. (1982). Stories are to
entertain: A structural-affect theory of stories. Journal
of Pragmatics, 6, 473-486.
Brewer, W. F., & Pani, J. R. (1983). The structure of human
memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning
and motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 17).
New York: Academic Press.
Brewer, W. F., & Pani, J. R. (1982, November). Personal memory,
generic memory, and skill: An empirical study. Paper
presented at the meetings of the Psychonomic Society,
Minneapolis.
Brewer, W. F., & Pani, J. R. (in preparation). Phenomenal reports
during memory recall.
Brewer, W. F., & Treyens, J. C. (1981). Role of schemata in
memory for places. Cognitive Psychology, 13, 207-230.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 75
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 76
Britton, B. K., Meyer, B. J. F., Simpson, R., Holdredge, T. S., &
Curry, C. (1979). Effects of the organization of text on
memory: Tests of two implications of a selective attention
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 5, 496-506.
Broadbent, D. E. (1970). Frederic Charles Bartlett: 1886-1969.
Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, 1970,
16, 1-13.
Charniak, E. (1977). A framed PAINTING: The representation of a
common sense knowledge fragment. Cognitive Science, 1, 355-
394.
Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). The mind's eye in chess. In
W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing. New York:
Academic Press.
Chiesi, H. L., Spilich, G. J., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Acquisition
of domain-related information in relation to high and low
domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 18, 257-273.
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge,
MA: M.I.T. Press.
Chomsky, N. (1980). Rules and representations. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Cirilo, R. K., & Foss, D. J. (1980). lext structure and reading
time for sentences. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Beh ior, 9i, 6-109.
Collins, A. M., & Quillian, M. R. (1969). Retrieval time from
semantic memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal
Behavior, 8, 240-247.
Collins, A. M., & Quillian, M. R. (1972). How to make a language
user. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of
memory. New York: Academic Press.
de Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and choice in chess. The
Hague: Moulton.
van Dijk, T. A. (1980). Macrostructures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
van Dijk, T. A., & Kintsch, W. (1978). Cognitive psychology and
discourse: Recalling and summarizing stories. In W. U.
Dressler (Ed.), Current trends in textlinguistics. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Dooling, D. J., & Lachman, R. (1971). Effects of comprehension on
retention of prose. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 88,
216-222.
Dooling, D. J., & Mullet, R. L. (1973). Locus of thematic effects
in retention of prose. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
97, 404-406.
Drever, J. (1965). The historical background for national trends
in psychology: On the non-existence of English
associationism. Journal of the History of the Behavioral
Sciences, 1, 123-130.
Ebbinghaus, H. (1964). Memory. New York: Dover. (Originally
published, 1885)
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 77
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 78
Fillmore, C. J. (1975). An alternative to checklist theories of
meaning. In Proceedings of the first annual meeting of the
Berkeley Linguistics Society, University of California,
Berkeley.
Fodor, J. A. (1968). The appeal to tacit knowledge in
psychological explanation. Journal of Philosophy, 65, 627-
640.
Friedman, A. (1979). Framing pictures: The role of knowledge in
automatized encoding and memory for gist. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 316-355.
Goldstein, I., & Papert, S. (1977). Artificial intelligence,
language, and the study of knowledge. Cognitive Science, 1,
84-123.
Gomulicki, B. R. (1956). Recall as an abstractive process. Acta
Psychologica, 12, 77-94.
Goodman, G. S. (1980). Picture memory: How the action schema
affects retention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 473-495.
Graesser, A. C. (1981). Prose comprehension beyond the word. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Graesser, A. C., Gordon, S. E., & Sawyer, J. D. (1979).
Recognition memory for typical and atypical actions in
scripted activities: Tests of a script pointer + tag
hypothesis. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,
18, 319-332.
Graesser, A. C., & Nakamura, G. V. (1982). The impact of a schema
on comprehension and memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The
psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research
and theory (Vol. 16). New York: Academic Press.
Graesser, A. C., Nakamura, G. V., Zimmerman, J. A. & Riha, J.
(1980). Recognition memory for script-relevant versus
irrelevant actions as a function of encoding conditions.
Unpublished manuscript, California State University
Fullerton.
Graesser, A. C., Well, S. B., Kowalski, D. J., & Smith, D. A.
(1980). Memory for typical and atypical actions in scripted
activities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 6, 503-515.
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L.
Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and semantics (Vol. 3), Speech acts.
New York: Seminar Press.
Head, H. (1918). Sensation and the cerebral cortex. Brain, 41,
57-253.
Head, H. (1920). Studies in neurology (Vol. 2). London: Hodder &
Stoughton.
Head, H., & Holmes, G. (1911). Sensory disturbances from cerebral
lesions. Brain, 34, 102-254.
Humphrey, G. (1951). Thinking. New York: Wiley.
Jenkins, J. G. (1935). Review of Remembering by F. C. Bartlett.
American Journal of Psychology, 47, 712-715.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 79
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 80
Jenkins, J. J., Wald; J., & Pittenger, J. B. (1978). Apprehending
pictorial events: An instance of psychological cohesion. In
C. W. Savage (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of
science (Vol. 9). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Johnson, R. E. (1970). Recall of prose as a function of the
structural importance of the linguistic units. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9, 12-20.
Kintsch, W. (1972). Notes on the structure of semantic memory.
In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory.
New York: Academic Press.
Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text
comprehension and production. Psychological Review, 85,
363-394.
Lachman, R., & Dooling, D. J. (1968). Connected discourse and
random strings: Effects of number of inputs on recognition
and recall. Journal of ExDerimental Psychology, 77, 517-
522.
Lashley, K. S. (1960). Cerebral organization and behavior. In F.
A. Beach, D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan, & H. W. Nissen (Eds.),
The neuropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lichtenstein, E. H. (1979). Memory for goal-directed events.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois.
Lichtenstein, E. H., & Brewer, W. F. (1980). Memory for goal-
directed events. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 412-445.
Loftus, G. R., & Mackworth, N. H. (1978). Cognitive determinants
of fixation location during picture viewing. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
4, 565-572.
Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Burns, H. G. (1978). Semantic
integration of verbal information into a visual memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
Memory, 4, 19-31.
McGeoch, J. A. (1933). Review of Remembering by F. C. Bartlett.
Psychological Bulletin, 30, 774-776.
Mandler, J. M. (1978). A code in the node: The use of a story
schema in retrieval. Discourse Processes, 1, 14-35.
Mandler, J. M., & Johnson, N. S. (1976). Some of the thousand
words a picture is worth. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 2, 529-540.
Mandler, J. M., & Johnson, N. S. (1977). Remembrance of things
parsed: Story structure and recall. Cognitive Psychology,
9, 111-151.
Mandler, J. M., & Johnson, N. S. (1980). On throwing out the baby
with the bathwater: A reply to Black and Wilensky's
evaluation of story grammars. Cognitive Science, 4, 305-
312.
Mandler, J. M., & Mandler, G. (1964). Thinking: From association
to Gestalt. New York: Wiley.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 81
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 82
Mandler, J. M., & Parker, R. E. (1976). Memory for descriptive
and spatial information in complex pictures. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 2, 38-
48.
Mandler, J. M., & Ritchey, G. H. (1977). Long-term memory for
pictures. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 3, 386-396.
Meyer, B. J. F., & McConkie, G. W., (1973). What is recalled
after hearing a passage? Journal of Educational Psychology,
65, 109-117.
Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P.
H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H.
Freeman.
Neisser, U. (1982). Memory observed. San Francisco: W. H.
Freeman.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Northway, M. L. (1940). The concept of the 'schema.' British
Journal of Psychology, 30, 316-325.
Oldfield, R. C. (1972). Frederic Charles Bartlett: 1886-1969.
American Journal of Psychology, 85, 133-140.
Oldfield, R. C., & Zangwill, 0. L. (1942a). Head's concept of the
schema and its application in contemporary British
psychology. Part I. Head's concept of the schema. British
Journal of Psychology, 32, 267-286.
Oldfield, R. C., & Zangwill, O. L. (1942b). Head's concept of the
schema and its application in contemporary British
psychology. Part II. Critical analysis of Head's thoery.
British Journal of Psychology, 33, 58-64.
Oldfield, R. C., & Zangwill, O. L. (194 3a). Head's concept of the
schema and its application in contemporary British
psychology. Part III. Bartlett's theory of memory.
British Journal of Psychology, 33, 113-129.
Oldfield, R. C., & Zangwill, 0. L. (1943b). Head's concept of the
schema and its application in comtemporary British
psychology. Part IV. Wolters' theory of thinking. British
Journal of Psychology, 33, 143-149.
Pichert, J. W., & Anderson, R. C. (1977). Taking different
perspectives on a story. Journal of Educational Psychology,
69, 309-315.
Putnam, H. (1973). Reductionism and the nature of psychology.
Cognition, 2, 131-146.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1973). What the mind's eye tells the mind's
brain: a critique of mental imagery. Psychological
Bulletin, 80, 1-24.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 83
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 84
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1978). Computational models and empirical
constraints. Behavioral and Brain Science, 1, 93-127.
Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.),
Semantic information processing. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T.
Press.
Reynolds, R. E. (1979). The effects of attention on the learning
and recall of important text elements. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Illinois.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G.
Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and
understanding. New York: Academic Press.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Understanding and summarizing brief
stories. In D. LaBerge & S. J. Samuels (Eds.), Basic
processes in reading: Perception and comprehension.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of
cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, & W. F. Brewer
(Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension:
Perspectives from cognitive psychology, linguistics,
artificial intelligence, and education. Hilldale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Rumelhart, D. E., & Ortony, A. (1977). The representation of knowledge in
memory. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E. Montague
(Eds.), Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1975). Scripts, plans, and
knowledge. Advance Papers of the Fourth International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Tbilisi, 151-157.
Schmidt, C. F., Sridharan, N. S., & Goodson, J. L. (1978). The
plan recognition problem: An intersection of psychology and
artificial intelligence. Artificial Intelligence, 11, 45-
83.
Schmidt, R. A. (1975). A schema theory of discrete motor skill
learning. Psychological Review, 82, 225-260.
Shebilske, W. L., & Reid, L. S. (1979). Reading eye movements,
macro-structure and the comprehension processes. In P. A.
Kolers, M. E. Wrolstad, & H. Bouma (Eds.), Processing of
visual language. New York: Plenum Press.
Smith, E. E. (1981). Organization of factual knowledge. In H. E.
Howe, Jr., & J. H. Flowers (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation (Vol. 28). Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.
Smith, E. E., Shoben, E. J., & Rips, L. J. (1974). Structure and
process in semantic memory: A featural model for semantic
decisions. Psychological Review, 81, 214-241.
Spiro, R. J. (1977). Remembering information from text: The 'state
of schema' approach. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, & W. E.
Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 85
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 86
Spiro, R. J. (1980). Constructive processes in prose
comprehension and recall. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, & W.
F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading
comprehension: Perspectives from cognitive psychology,
linguistics, artificial intelligence, and education.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Steffensen, M. S., & Colker, L. (1982). Intercultural
misunderstandings about health care: Recall of descriptions
of illness and treatments. Social Science & Medicine, 16,
1949-1954.
Stein, N. L., & Glenn, C. G. (1979). An analysis of story
comprehension in elementary school children. In R. 0.
Freedle (Ed.), New directions in discourse processing.
Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Sulin, R. A., & Dooling, D. J. (1974). Intrusion of a thematic
idea in retention of prose. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 103, 255-262.
Suppe, F. (Ed.) (1977), The structure of scientific theories (2nd ed.).
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Thagard, P. (1980, January). The representation of knowledge in
frame system. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Michigan-Dearborn.
Thagard, P. (1982, May). Scientific theories as frame systems.
Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan-Dearborn.
Thieman, T. J., & Brewer, W. F. (1978). Alfred Binet on memory
for ideas. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 97, 243-264.
Thorndyke, P. W. (1977). Cognitive structures in comprehension
and memory of narrative disourse. Cognitive Psychology, 9,
77-110.
Thorndyke, P. W., & Yekovich, F. R. (1980). A critique of
schema-based theories of human story memory. Poetics, 9,
23-49.
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving
& W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory. New York:
Academic Press.
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviorist views it.
Psychological Review, 20, 158-177.
Welborn, E. L., & English, H. (1937). Logical learning and
retention: A general review of experiments with meaningful
verbal materials. Psychological Bulletin, 34, 1-20.
Wyer, R. S., Jr., Srull, T. K., Gordon, S. E., & Hartwick, J.
(1982). Effects of processing objectives on the recall of
prose material. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 43, 674-688.
Zangwill, 0. L. (1972). Remembering revisited. Quarterly Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 24, 123-138.
The Nature and Functions of Schemas 87
Table 1
A Classification of Major Research Paradigms in Terms of the
Contrast Between the Assumptions of British Empiricism and Continental Philosophy
British Bartlett's Stimulus- Information Modern Revised Continental
Empiricism Theory Response Processing Schema Schema Philosophy
Atomistic
Parsimonious
+ +
+ +
Associationistic
Particularistic
Passive
Mechanistic
Finite
Non Associationistic
Generic/Abstract
Active+
+
+
Purposive
Generative
Note. + indicates general acceptance of the British Empiricist assumptions.
- indicates general acceptance of the Continental assumptions.
+- indicates that some members took one position and some the other.
In order to make the contrast clear the description of British Empiricism is of a
conservative version of that tradition.
Molar
Modular
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